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STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION FOR LEGAL
SERVICES: RESURRECTING THE ETHICAL
DILEMMA
Sharon Mary Mathew*
I. INTRODUCTION
Stock compensation is now a popular method of payment
for legal services, especially within the Silicon Valley of Cali-
fornia.' Rather than part with traditional fees, small start-
ups with little cash often find it much easier to give an attor-
ney an interest in the corporation. Even after the stock mar-
ket crash of April 2000, many law firms focusing their prac-
tice on the high tech sector still take the "long view" and
accept stockholdings from their clients in hopes that the
economy will recover.' But one thing has changed since the
crash; the number of federal securities class action suits tar-
geting high-tech companies is increasing.4 Although these
types of lawsuits are to be expected when the market plum-
mets, law firms should begin to consider carefully whether
heavy investments in clients in lieu of traditional fees pose
ethical hurdles too high to pass, or lead to potentially serious
securities liability.
The underlying ethical question regarding whether at-
torneys should ever take stock compensation, has, for the
* Senior Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 42. J.D.
candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S. Grove City College.
1. See Debra Baker, Who Wants to Be A Millionaire?, 86 A.B.A. J. 36, 36-37
(Feb. 2000); see also Shawn Neidorf, Silicon Valley Lawyers Embrace VC-Like
Role, VENTURE CAP. L. J., Oct. 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Ven-
ture Capital Law Journal.
2. See Baker, supra note 1, at 37.
3. See Francy Blackwood, Lawyers Take Long View and Put Stock in Cli-
ents, S. F. Bus. TiMES, June 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 16614559.
4. See Martha Neil, High-Tech's High Noon: With the Market Fizzle, a New
Round of Securities Suits Takes Aim at Once High-Flying IPOs, 88 A.B.A. J. 48,
50 (Mar. 2002).
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most part, been dismissed.' Instead, law firms are asking for
clarification regarding the steps required for meeting Ameri-
can Bar Association ("ABA") standards when taking an equity
interest in the client.6 In an attempt to clear up any misun-
derstandings regarding the legality of stock compensation,
the ABA issued Formal Opinion 418 in July of 2000.' The
ABA pronounced that the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct ("Model Rules") do not prohibit an attorney from accept-
ing fees in the form of client stock.8 No "inherent" conflict of
interest arises when stock compensation is received from a
corporate client.9 Nevertheless, the ABA cautioned that an
attorney must comply with Model Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a) of
the MRPC. ° Rule 1.7(b) prohibits an attorney from repre-
senting a client if the attorney's own interests would inter-
fere, while Rule 1.8 addresses how this prohibition works in
the context of business dealings between attorney and client.
The opinion itself, however, seems to pose an inherent
conflict." Can an attorney ever accept stock compensation
and remain in compliance with Model Rules 1.7 and 1.8. as
well as the ABA "reasonable fee" requirements?" Non-
compliance certainly appears inevitable except in carefully
guarded circumstances." But the ethical difficulties that at-
torneys face when attempting to adhere to the canons of pro-
fessional responsibility, while at the same time taking an eq-
uitable interest in a corporate client, appear somewhat
understated in the ABA opinion." The problems are numer-
ous indeed, but the opinion speaks only briefly of the dangers
involved.'
To add to this ethical quandary, attorneys fearing securi-
5. See George Reimer, Bar Counsels Stock for Fees? Guidance for Owner-
ship Interests in Clients, 61-Oct. OR. ST. B. BULL., 33, 34 (Oct. 2000).
6. See id.
7. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 418
(2000) (discussing the legality of accepting stock compensation in lieu of fees)
[hereinafter Formal Opinion 418].
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7.
11. See infra Part IV.C.1.
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (1984).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7 (stating that taking a stock inter-
est in a client corporation typically enhances representation).
15. See infra Part IV.
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ties lawsuits must also evaluate the influence they wield as
both attorney and investor in the corporate client. The risk of
being sued as a "controlling person" under various provisions
of the Securities Exchange Acts, should lead attorneys to con-
sider whether these types of transactions are truly worth-
while in a post-crash environment where litigious stockhold-
ers are desperately seeking more defendants.
The purpose of this comment is to encourage law firms
and attorneys to be more scrupulous when accepting stock
compensation agreements. A conflict appears to exist mainly
because compensation in the form of stockholdings may mate-
rially limit an attorney's ability to represent the client.1" An
attorney accepting fees in stock may be tempted to disregard
the Model Rules requirements of full disclosure and client
consent. 7 In addition to examining the ethical limitations
placed upon attorneys accepting stock compensation, this
comment also analyzes the Securities Exchange Act "control-
ling person" liability that law firms may face when accepting
stock compensation.
Part II of this comment examines the rationale for regu-
lating certain attorney-client conflicts of interest. Part II also
reviews the current status of the law regarding conflicts of in-
terest associated with stock compensation agreements and
provides background on securities liability for investing at-
torneys. Part III questions whether law firms should be more
diligent in regulating stock compensation transactions, and
whether the ABA should consider banning these transactions
altogether. Part IV analyzes ABA Formal Opinion 418 and
Model Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a), and investigates the ways in
which attorneys open themselves up for disciplinary action
and malpractice suits when they agree to accept stock com-
pensation. Part V suggests steps that law firms should take
in order to avoid disciplinary action and federal securities
lawsuits.
II. BACKGROUND
It has become quite common for law firms, especially
those representing high-tech, start-up companies, to acquire
financial interests in their clients in connection with legal
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part IV.
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services rendered.'8 These exchanges are often used to aid
start-ups that cannot afford to pay high legal fees because
they do not yet have a product with which to generate reve-
nue. 9 Instead of cash, they can offer their attorney equity in
the corporation. Due to the staggering profits that may be
gained from these transactions, attorneys also stand to bene-
fit from accepting stock compensation. 20 For example, in De-
cember, 1999, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich and Rosati posted
paper profits of $24.5 million in a single day when its client
VA Linux, a Silicon Valley software-maker, made its initial
public stock offering.2' Even after the stock market crash, the
potential realization of such high profits still drives law firms
to gamble on clients that are about to go public.2
This type of "gambling" may occur in one of two ways.
Law firms may choose to accept an equitable interest in a cli-
ent either in lieu of traditional fees or for general investment,
to be accompanied by regular fees.2' Attorneys accepting
stock compensation in lieu of fees face greater ethical hurdles
both because their dependency on the financial well-being of
the company is increased and because they must ensure that
the fee requested is reasonable. Either way, the acquisition
of stock in a corporate client is basically a business transac-
tion between the attorney or the law firm and the client.24
The transaction, therefore, must meet the requirements of
the professional rules of ethics established by the bar.2'
Before discussing the status of common law and the ABA
professional rules, a brief introduction to conflicts of interest
18. See Baker, supra note 1, at 37.
19. See Barrie Althoff, Ethics and the Law, Investing in Your Clients Busi-
ness, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Mar. 2000, available athttp://www.wsba.org/barnews/2000/03/ethics-investing.htm.
20. See Neidorf, supra note 1; but see Baker, supra note 1, at 39 (noting thatdespite the jackpots that many investors find, observers estimate that losers
outnumber winners by as many as 20 to 1).
21. See Jeff Manning, Ethics & Economics the Technology Boom EnticesMany Lawyers Into Becoming Shareholders as Well as Advisers to Corporate
Clients, but Such Arrangements Raise Worries, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 27,
2000, available at 2000 WL 5380401.
22. See Blackwood, supra note 3.
23. See Tanya Patterson, Heightened Securities Liability for Lawyers Who
Invest in Their Clients: Worth the Risk? 80 TEX. L. REV. 639, 642 (2002).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126 cmt.
b, illus. 1 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
25. See NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 159 (1998).
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is useful.
A. Rationale for Regulating Certain Attorney-Client
Conflicts of Interest
An attorney owes many duties to his clients including
competence, communication and zeal.26 All of these ethical
concerns are threatened when an attorney's personal inter-
ests conflict with the interests of his client. 7 In the modern
view of professional responsibility, a conflict of interest exists
whenever the quality of the attorney's representation is "at
risk."28 This is true even though there may be no actual
breach of the aforementioned duties. 9 The risk is not defined
as a potential for conflict, but as conflict itself.2 0
Therefore, the conflict of interest arises before the attor-
ney actually breaches one or more of the duties he owes the
client. Proscriptions of certain attorney-client conflicts of in-
terest are designed to act as a prophylactic.31 This rationale is
clearly "preventive" in nature in that a potential breach
should be stopped before it occurs.3 2
In addition to the preventive rationale, there exists an-
other reason for regulating conflicts of interest.33 This second
rationale basically states that attorneys ought to avoid the
appearance of impropriety. 4 There should exist no reason-
able grounds for the belief that the attorney has acted on his
own behalf.5 Even if the attorney has not actually engaged in
any suspicious action, prohibitions on certain transactions are
enacted for the purpose of avoiding the appearance that the
suspicious action might have occurred. 6
26. See id.
27. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT §
10.1 (2d ed. Supp. 1998).
28. See id. at § 10.4.
29. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 181
(1990).
30. See id.
31. See id. at 175-80.
32. See id. at 175.
33. See FREEDMAN, supra note 29, at 177.
34. See id. at 177-80.
35. See id.
36. See id.
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B. ABA Standards Governing Conflicts of Interest
1. The ABA Model Rules and Model Code
When entering into business transactions with clients,
attorneys are obligated to abide by both common law fiduci-
ary principles and the disciplinary rules adopted by bar asso-
ciations. 7 For the most part, the states have embraced the
ethical standards provided by the bar."5 The ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") have been
adopted by most states, but some still continue to use the
older Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code"). 9 Both sets of provisions enable the bar to take disci-
plinary action when the rules are violated. ° Both the Model
Rules and the Model Code have similar requirements for
business transactions with clients, the main difference being
that the Model Rules require that disclosure and consent be
in writing.4' The remainder of this comment will focus on the
language of the more modern Model Rules.
a. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7
Rule 1.7(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct states in part:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client may be materially limited by... the lawyer's
own interests, unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes
the representation will not be adversely affected and (2)
the client consents after consultation.42
It is important to note the particular language used: "may be
materially limited" as opposed to "would be materially lim-
ited." This generally means that if any possibility of conflict
37. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts is Different, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 445 (1998).
38. See 7 C.J.S. Attorney & Client 44 (1980); 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 27, at 101.
39. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND ETHICS 4-5 (5th ed. 1998); see also Rand v. Monsato, 926 F.2d 596, 601-03
(7th Cir. 1991).
40. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 8.11.2-.5(1986) (comparing prohibitions and remedies of the Model Rules and the Model
Code).
41. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-104 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (1984).
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1984).
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exists, and the attorney's own interests would materially
limit representation of the client, then the attorney must
withdraw from representation unless the two stated condi-
tions are met.43 The attorney must reasonably believe that
even though a conflict exists, the conflict will not adversely
affect his representation of the client, and secondly the client
must give his informed consent to the transaction.44
The ABA, in its official comment to Rule 1.7, states that
the possibility or risk of a conflict does not itself preclude the
attorney from representing the client.45 The particular con-
flict of interest circumstances that the ABA deems serious
enough to be banned altogether are included in Rule 1.8.46 A
restriction on receiving stock compensation in lieu of fees is
not included among them.47
The ABA determining factors for assessing whether rep-
resentation should be denied are:
the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does,
whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's in-
dependent professional judgment in considering alterna-
tives or foreclosure courses of action that reasonably
should be pursued on behalf of the client.
48
Therefore, when the risk of conflict is small, only modest re-
strictions are required.4" The same is true of a situation
where the risk of conflict is high, but the harm is only likely
to be slight, if any at all. ° On the other hand, where the risk
of conflict is high and some harm is likely to occur in the
course of representation, the attorney must withdraw from
representation of the client."'
43. See FREEDMAN, supra note 29, at 189. "If Model Rule 1.7(b) required
that [a] lawyer reasonably believe that there is no risk when, by hypothesis,
there is a foreseeable risk, the rule would appear to say that the lawyer can
never represent a client when there is a conflict of interest, regardless of client
consent." Id. at 190. Most scholars, however, do not interpret the rule this way.
Id.
44. See id.
45. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) cmt.
46. See id. R. 1.8(b), (c), (d), (g), (h), (i).
47. See id.
48. See id. R. 1.7(b) cmt.
49. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 27, at § 10.4.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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b. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) and
Common Law Interpretation
In addition to Rule 1.7(b), Rule 1.8(a) also governs certain
conflicts of interest.52 Rule 1.8(a) requires that in any busi-
ness transaction between attorney and client, the transaction
must be fair and reasonable and fully disclosed in writing to
the client, the client must consent in writing to the agree-
ment, and the client must be given time to seek independent
counsel.53 Unlike Rule 1.7(b), which applies only when repre-
sentation may be materially limited, Rule 1.8(a) applies any-
time a lawyer accepts an interest in the client in connection
with a fee for legal services.54 Rule 1.8(a), however, does not
apply when an attorney receives stock in other circumstances
not involving direct intervention of the client.55
As applied to stock compensation, the reasoning behind
this rule is clear. There are two main dangers associated
with taking stock in lieu of fees: (1) if the business flourishes
financially, the fee may later appear unreasonably large for
the work performed; or (2) if the business falters, the attor-
ney, worried about recovering his fee, may be tempted to ad-
vise his client to take self-motivated or even illegal meas-
ures.56 Due to the trusting relationship that exists between
most attorneys and their clients, an attorney may take ad-
vantage of his client in these circumstances.57 The precau-
tionary measures provided in Rule 1.7 and 1.8 aid in prevent-
ing this type of overreaching in business transactions.58
Rule 1.8(a) requires more on the part of the attorney than
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a).
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuni-
ary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the in-
terest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed
and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be
reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice
of independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Id.
53. See id.
54. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7, at 3.
55. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 126 cmt. a.
56. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 27, at § 12.5 illus. 12-3.
57. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 126 cmt. b.
58. See id.
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may initially appear from a hasty reading of the provision. In
fact, cases noting violations of Rule 1.8(a) and the correspond-
ing Model Code section are numerous. 9 A few are introduced
here.
i. Fair and Reasonable Transaction
The first requirement under Rule 1.8(a) is that the busi-
ness transaction be fair and reasonable to the client.6" The re-
lationship between an attorney and client is a fiduciary rela-
tionship of the very highest character. For that reason, all
dealings between an attorney and his client that are benefi-
cial to the attorney will be closely scrutinized with the utmost
strictness for any unfairness.61
An attorney bears the burden of showing that the deal-
ings between the parties were fair and reasonable and were
fully known and understood by the client. 2 For example, in
In Re Imming," an attorney-client business transaction case,
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that "the attorney must
show a measure of good faith in dealing with clients which is
much higher than what is required of parties dealing at arm's
length."4 The fairness of the transaction is determined based
on facts that reasonably could be known at the time of the
transaction, not as the facts later develop. The best test for
this analysis is whether an uninterested attorney would have
advised the client not to enter into the transaction.66
ii. Full Disclosure
In addition to a showing of fairness, the Model Rules re-
quire full written disclosure in order to ensure that the client
is aware of all possible conflicts before engaging in the trans-
59. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 126 cmt. a-g.
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (1984).
61. See, e.g., Hunniecutt v. State Bar, 748 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1988).
62. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 126 cmt. b; see also Clancy v. State
Bar, 454 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1969).
63. 545 N.E.2d 715 (Ill. 1989).
64. Id. at 722.
65. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 126 cmt. e; see also Attorney Griev-
ance Comm'n v. Collins, 457 A.2d 1134 (Md. 1983) (discipline of attorney who
represented buyer in a contract while secretly working for the seller, advised
client that the transaction was reasonable). Compare McCray v. Weinberg, 340
N.E.2d 518 (Mass. App. Ct. 1976) (holding that attorney may not have to prove
fairness when the client is knowledgeable and experienced in transaction).
66. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 126 cmt. e.
12352002]
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action with the attorney. There are numerous state cases re-
garding this issue. Two such cases are introduced below.
In Committee on Professional Ethics of Conduct v. Mer-
67shon, an attorney took twenty percent of stock in lieu of fees
in a corporation he formed with his client." The corporation
never took off and the attorney never made a profit.69 Al-
though the attorney was completely honest and forthright in
the transaction, he neglected to disclose the possibilities of
conflict associated with tying his fee for future services to a
present interest in the corporation. 7' The Supreme Court of
Iowa reprimanded the attorney for failing to meet the "high
standard of disclosure" required by the ABA.'
Additionally, in In Re McGlothlen,7" another conflicting
interests case, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
the disclosure which accompanies a business transaction be-
tween attorney and client must be complete. 3 In defining
"completeness" the court held that the attorney must show
that he used no undue influence, but that he gave the client
all the information that a disinterested attorney would have
provided. 4 "So strict is the rule on this subject that dealings
between an attorney and his client are held, as against the
attorney, to be prima facie fraudulent."' 5
Common law is replete with cases in which attorneys
were disciplined for failing to disclose certain information
when engaging in business transactions with clients.6 There-
fore, an attorney must be careful to reveal all relevant infor-
mation to the client before agreeing to stock compensation.
67. 316 N.W. 895 (Iowa 1982).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 899.
72. 663 P.2d 1330 (Wash. 1983).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1336.
76. See, e.g., Avianca Corp. v. Harrison, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that lawyer's failure to comply with disclosure obligations created rebut-
table presumption that business transaction was unfair); In re D'Angelo 733
P.2d 360 (N.M. 1986) (imposing discipline on attorney who induced client to in-
vest in a real estate development without disclosing attorney's ownership of real
estate).
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iii. Independent Counsel
Model Rule 1.8(a) also requires that the client be given a
reasonable opportunity to obtain independent legal counsel.77
The Model Rules do not, however, require that the client ac-
tually consult another attorney.78 A client might decide to
consult another trusted adviser, such as an accountant, a tax
advisor, or a business person, or to consult no one at all. 9
This opportunity to obtain competent independent advice
helps to ensure that the client has time to consider the trans-
action and that the attorney is not applying undue pressure
on the client.8" On the other hand, if the attorney fails to ad-
vise the client to obtain independent advice, evidence of this
inaction may be used to show overreaching on the part of the
attorney.8'
Passante v. McWilliam,82 a California case, provides a
good example of the unfortunate repercussions that may oc-
cur when an attorney neglects to advise his client to obtain
independent counsel.83 In that case, the attorney attempted
to enforce an agreement whereby his corporate client was to
pay him three percent of the company stock for legal ser-
vices. 84 But because the attorney failed to advise the board of
the company to consider obtaining independent counsel, the
lawyer lost the entire value of his purported portion of the
stock, which had been calculated by a jury at 32 million dol-
lars.8" The attorney was therefore paid nothing for his ser-
vices."
c. Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5 and 2.1
Attorneys accepting stock compensation must also con-
sider the reasonableness of the fee agreement. In Rule 1.5,
the ABA has outlined several factors to consider when assign-
ing a fee to particular legal representation.87 In order to apply
77. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (1984).
78. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7, at 8.
79. See id.
80. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 126 cmt. f.
81. See id.
82. 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (1984).
20021 1237
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the reasonableness requirement of Rule 1.5 to stock compen-
sation agreements generally, certain factors must be ana-
lyzed. The Utah State Bar, in an Ethics Advisory Opinion, of-
fered the following:
(a) The liquidity of the client's stock, including whether
the client's stock trades publicly at the time of the fee
agreement and, if the stock is not publicly traded, the risk
that the client's stock will not be publicly traded in the fu-
ture; (b) the present and anticipated value of the client's
stock including the risks that a proposed patent or trade-
mark may not be granted, that necessary government ap-
provals (such as FDA approvals), may not be received; (c)
whether the stock is subject to restrictions after the law
firm receives it, and which affect the value of the stock to
the lawyer; (d) the quantity of stock owned by the lawyer
and whether the lawyer may exercise voting control over
the client after receipt of the stock; and (e) any restrictions
placed by the lawyer on the consideration paid for the
stock.88
The opinion notes that since many of these transactions are
made before the stock is offered for public trade, the actual or
potential value of the stock may be difficult to determine and
attorneys and law firms may be caught inadvertently request-
89ing an unreasonable fee for their services.
The Model Rules do permit attorneys to act as advisors to
A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in de-
termining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal ser-
vice properly;
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal ser-
vices;
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circum-
stances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services;
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Id.
88. See UTAH ST. B. ETHICS ADVISORY COMM., Opinion 98-13, at 1 (1998).
89. See id. at 2.
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their clients in matters outside the scope of legal representa-
tion. Rule 2.1 provides that:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independ-
ent professional judgment and render candid advice. In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situa-
tion.9"
The first sentence is most relevant to stock compensation
agreements between attorneys and their clients. An attorney
may choose to take on a more substantial role in a corporation
by providing business or "economic" advice to management.
It is not uncommon for attorneys to render this advice on a
regular basis when they work closely with the management of
the corporation. But when the attorney is actually depending
on the economic well-being of the corporation for legal fees he
may be walking a fine line on the issue of independence.
2. ABA Formal Opinion 418
The ABA released Formal Opinion 418 in July of 2000. 9"
This opinion deals directly with some of the ethical issues
arising when attorneys acquire an ownership interest in a cli-
ent in lieu of fees." As mentioned above, the ABA has held
that no inherent conflict arises when an attorney providing
legal services to a business invests in that same business.93
The ABA cited several reasons for condoning stock com-
pensation.14  First, the attorney's willingness to invest with
entrepreneurs in a start-up company is often viewed as a vote
of attorney confidence in the business.95 Regarding this issue,
the chairman of one Portland law firm stated that from the
client's point of view, "it's almost to the point that if your law-
yer isn't willing to put a little skin in the game, maybe you
have the wrong lawyer." Many clients do see investment as a
90. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (emphasis added).
91. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7.
92. See id.
93. See id. But see generally ABA Commission on Professionalism, In the
Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint for Rekindling Lawyer Professionalism
(1986). The commission expressed the view that the conflicts likely to arise
when an attorney enters into a business transaction with a client change the
attorney-client relationship in a fundamental way. See id.
94. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7, at 2.
95. See id.
20021 1239
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as a sign of the law firm's loyalty to the corporation and will-
ingness to do whatever it takes to help that company succeed.
Additionally, clients sometimes believe that attorneys receiv-
ing compensation in stock are more inclined to work effi-
ciently than those attorneys receiving traditional fees.96
As a second reason for permitting stock compensation
agreements, the ABA formal opinion notes that an attorney's
willingness to accept stock instead of a cash fee may be the
only way for a cash-poor client to obtain competent legal ad-
vice.97 Third, the opinion states that because management's
role is primarily to enhance the business's value for the
stockholders, the interests of the attorney and the corporation
will often coincide.9" The opinion notes that "[i]n some cir-
cumstances, such as a merger of one corporation in which the
lawyer owns stock in the larger entity, the lawyer's economic
incentive to complete the transaction may even be en-
hanced."99
C. Regulation of Stock Compensation and Investments
Under the Securities Exchange Acts
1. Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act makes it
unlawful for any person "to use or employ... any manipulat-
ive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors." Subsection (5) specifically defines "ma-
nipulative" actions:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make statements made, (c) To engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or
96. See Manning, supra note 21.
97. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7, at 2.
98. See id.
99. See id.
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would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
An individual may be found liable under section 10b-5 when
the plaintiff proves the following: (1) misrepresentation,
omission, or nondisclosure, (2) existence of a duty, (3) intent
to defraud, (4) materiality, (5) reliance and (6) injury.'
In order to make a showing sufficient to meet the first
requirement "the defendant must make either a material
misrepresentation, omit a material fact, or completely fail to
disclose a topic of material importance (nondisclosure)."1 1 De-
fendants may be held liable for an investor's pecuniary losses
caused by the defendant's "misrepresentation of fact, opinion,
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or
to refrain from action in reliance upon it."'
In Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelderl' the Supreme Court
held that scienter, or fraudulent intent is required in order
for a 10b-5 claim to be successful. Negligence is not sufficient
to meet this test. Additionally, in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.,' the Supreme Court defined materiality by
stating that "an omitted fact is material if there is a substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote."1°' With regard to reliance,
if the plaintiff is claiming that defendant misrepresented or
omitted information, then the plaintiff must show that the
"defendant's action induced them to purchase or sell the secu-
rity."0 6 On the other hand, if the plaintiff is claiming nondis-
closure, then reliance is presumed.
2. Liability Under Section 15, Securities Exchange Act
of 1933 and Section 20, Securities Exchange Act of
1934.
Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 ("1933
100. See Patterson, supra note 23, at 649.
101. See Cynthia A. Bedrick, Defining the Duty: Attorney's Obligations Under
Rule 10b-5, 74 IND. L.J. 1297, 1300 (1997).
102. See id.
103. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
104. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
105. Id. at 449. In TSC, the definition applied to 14a-9 claims, but the defini-
tion has been extended to cover 10b-5 claims. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988).
106. See Bedrick, supra note 101, at 1301 (citing Latigo Ventures v. Laven-
thol & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322, 1325 (7th Cir. 1989)).
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Act") provides that individuals may be held liable for control-
ling the actions of other parties who are found liable under
section 11 or section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act.107
These controlling individuals will be held jointly and sever-
ally liable with the controlled person "unless the controlling
person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in
the existence of facts" of which the controlled person had
knowledge. °8
Section 11 of the 1933 Act provides a cause of action for
plaintiffs acquiring security where the registration contained
an "untrue statement of material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated."'' 9 These plaintiffs may
sue, among others, every person who signed the registration
statement and every director or partner at the time of filing."'
As noted above, attorneys may be held liable for the actions of
such directors and partners, when the plaintiff can show that
the attorney was acting as a controlling person in these
transactions.
Furthermore, section 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 provides that "every person who, directly or indirectly,
controls any person liable under any provision of this title or
any regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and sev-
erally" along with the controlled person."' Unlike section 15,
section 20 makes controlling persons liable for "violations of
any part of the 1934 act.""' Therefore, liability under section
20 is broader than section 15 liability which only holds indi-
viduals responsible for misrepresentations associated with an
initial public offering.1
3
D. Rules Governing Certified Public Accountants
Unlike attorneys, accountants are not permitted to en-
gage in stock compensation agreements with clients. The
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA")
Code of Professional Conduct provides specific standards for
maintaining independent judgment. Rule 101 states that "[a]
107. See Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. 77(o) (2000).
108. See id.
109. See Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. 77k(a) (2000).
110. See id.
111. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20, 15 U.S.C. 78(t) (2000).
112. See Patterson, supra note 23, at 663.
113. See id.
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member in public practice shall be independent in the per-
formance of professional services." 114 The AICPA interpreta-
tion of Rule 101 provides that "independence shall be consid-
ered impaired if: during the period of professional
engagement a covered member had or was committed to ac-
quire any direct or material indirect financial interest in the
client."15 Although it is certainly true that these rules do not
regulate the conduct of attorneys, it is interesting that an-
other group of professionals looks at the same type of transac-
tion with such great scrutiny. Furthermore, it seems that the
regulation has been put in place simply to guard against lack
of "independent" action on the part of accountants. Maintain-
ing independence from the client is a requirement for attor-
neys as well as accountants, so it is somewhat perplexing that
one group of professionals should treat the same type of
transaction so much more harshly than another group. 6 It
appears that if the ABA were truly interested in preserving
attorney independence, they too would prohibit these types of
investments.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Attorneys and law firms face a serious ethical dilemma
when deciding whether to accept stock compensation from
their clients in lieu of traditional fees. In 2000, all eyes
turned to the ABA for an ethical mandate."7 The ABA sur-
prised many by refusing to ban stock compensation agree-
ments and instead asserting that attorneys may avoid ethical
battles altogether when accepting such compensation as long
as they abide by the Model Rules." 8 Caselaw has shown,
however, that unless attorneys are exceptionally fastidious in
their business dealings with clients, they will not be able to
meet the stringent requirements of Model Rule 1.7 and 1.8.9
Additionally, by entering into stock compensation agree-
ments, attorneys open themselves up for actions based on
various provisions of the Securities Exchange Acts. Thus, two
114. See CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 101 (American Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1992).
115. See id. R. 101 interpretation .02 101-1.
116. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (1984).
117. See supra Part II.
118. See supra Part II.B.2; Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7.
119. See supra Part II.B.1.
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issues must be addressed: whether the ABA should prohibit
these transactions altogether, and, if that is not a viable op-
tion, whether law firms should consider implementing more
stringent stock compensation regulations in order to reduce
the likelihood of securities fraud and other ethical violations.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Taking Stock Compensation and Abiding by Model Rule
1.7(b) and Model Rule 1.5
An attorney has three options when considering whether
to accept stock from a start-up business: (1) make no invest-
ment; (2) invest, but discontinue legal service; or (3) invest
and provide legal services.' The last choice is sometimes re-
ferred to as the most "ethically perilous."2
1. Meeting the Reasonableness Requirement
An attorney must abide by Model Rule 1.7 whenever the
possibility of conflict exists between his own interests and the
interests of the corporation.'22 Therefore, an attorney must
make two "reasonableness" assessments: (1) whether it is
reasonable to believe that there is no possibility of conflict,
and (2) whether it is reasonable to believe that representation
will not be affected by the attorney's own interests.' The
conflict will be waived if the attorney's representation of the
client will not be adversely affected by his own interest and
the client gives full consent to the transaction.'
The MRPC define the phrase "reasonably believe" to
mean that the attorney ought to "believe the matter in ques-
tion and that the circumstances are such that the belief is
reasonable." 21 "Reasonableness of lawyers" is defined as "the
conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer."'
120. See Althoff, supra note 19.
121. See id.
122. See FREEDMAN, supra note 29, at 190.
123. See id. Additionally, Model Rule 1.5 sets forth a third reasonableness
test. Attorneys may not charge an excessive or unreasonable fee. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (1984); see also Jason M. Klein, No Fool for a
Client: The Finance and Incentives Behind Stock-Based Compensation for Cor-
porate Attorneys, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 330, 331 (1999).
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1984).
125. See GILLERS, supra note 39, at 16-17.
126. See id.
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Taking these definitions together, one can deduce that rea-
sonableness is measured both subjectively and objectively.2
The attorney must believe that his own interests will not ma-
terially interfere with the interests of the client, and objec-
tively, in the eyes of other reasonably prudent and competent
attorneys, that belief must be reasonable.' This standard is
difficult to meet when accepting stock compensation from a
client. 129 Attorneys will think differently about investments
based on "the size of the investment, their personal comfort
with differing levels of risk, whether their investment is ac-
tive or passive, and the scrupulousness of their conscience.'
30
When attorneys live by the subjective rule, they are
bound for rough waters. If an attorney unreasonably believes
that his representation of the client will not be affected by his
equity interest in the corporation, he is violating Rule 1.7 by
continuing to represent the client even if the client consents
to the agreement.' This problem is often faced because
many start-up businesses without cash are desperate to ac-
quire legal representation. An attorney who jumps into the
deal and accepts stock compensation without thinking the
matter through carefully may open himself up to malpractice
lawsuits."2 Additionally, more problems will arise for the at-
torney who neglects to make the required reasonableness as-
sessment at every emerging conflict during the course of rep-
resentation.
In Formal Opinion 418, the ABA mentions some of the
circumstances where an attorney's interests in the corpora-
tion could conflict with the interests of the client in such a
way that it would be unreasonable to continue representa-
tion.' The opinion notes that the attorney's ability to render
an opinion on behalf of the corporation may be jeopardized
when he is receiving stock compensation.' The attorney
must "evaluate h[is] ability to maintain the requisite profes-
127. See Althoff, supra note 19.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 27, at § 11.
132. See Jill Schachner Chanen, Banking on Client Futures: Internet Econ-
omy Spurs Solos and Small Firms to Trade Services for Stock, 86 A.B.A. J. 78
(June 2000).
133. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7, at 8-1.1.
134. See id.
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sional independence by subordinating any economic incentive
arising from her stock ownership in the corporation."'35 An-
other example is a situation where an attorney is depending
upon the proceeds of the stock compensation as a major as-
set.'36 These are just some of the ways that an attorney's rep-
resentation may be materially limited when stock compensa-
tion agreements are made.
2. The Misconception of Client Consent
Rule 1.7(b) permits client consent to waive a conflict of
interest, provided that the consent is given after consultation
and the lawyer has satisfied the reasonable belief require-
ment.'37 Under this subsection, because the client obviously
does not know whether the representation will be affected by
the attorney's personal interests, an attorney must be careful
not even to ask for or accept client consent unless he is him-
self independently satisfied that his representation will not
be adversely affected by his own interest in the transaction.'
One problem with client consent, noted by the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity in Formal Opinion 93-372, is the issue of prospective con-
flicts of interest between attorney and client.'39 This would be
a situation where the exact nature of the conflict is not yet
known, but the client is still agreeing to waive it."' The ABA
has stated that although this type of waiver is acceptable, it
may not be dispositive if a later conflict does arise."' The
ABA is guarded in its acceptance of prospective waivers
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1984); see also RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 24, § 122(2).
Notwithstanding the informed consent of each affected client or former
client, a lawyer may not represent a client if:
(a) the representation is prohibited by law;
(b) one client will assert a claim against the other in the same liti-
gation; or
(c) in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the lawyer
will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of
the clients.
Id.
138. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 27, at § 11.
139. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 372
(1999) [hereinafter Formal Opinion 372].
140. See id.
141. See id.
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mainly because it acknowledges that a waiver is not sufficient
to cure a conflict of interest situation. As mentioned above, a
reasonable belief on the part of the attorney is required in
addition to client waiver.
142
Additionally, it bears repeating that waiver of a presently
unknown conflict differs from waiver of an actual conflict
where the attorney is already aware that the risk of harm is
present. In the latter case, the client must consent to that
specific conflict even if a prospective waiver has been signed
in advance. 143 As the ABA has noted, a prospective waiver is
never ethically conclusive.'1 Therefore, when an attorney
faces an actual conflict between his personal interests in the
stock of the corporation and his duty to represent the client,
he must determine whether he can reasonably continue to
represent the client.'45 After that evaluation is made, the at-
torney must once again seek the client's consent in order to
continue representation.
146
For attorneys accepting stock in lieu of fees these "actual
conflicts" arise with some frequency. Circumstances sur-
rounding corporate disclosures, mergers and attorney evalua-
tions for third parties are just a few examples of such con-
flicts. 47  In these situations, the conflict "might foreclose
alternatives that otherwise might be available to the client."
148
Therefore, the attorney must seek client consent again in or-
der to continue representation.
The difficulty here is obvious. If an attorney forgets to
reevaluate the circumstances and obtain client consent when
an actual conflict arises, he is then opening himself up for
malpractice suits and possible disciplinary action. Liability is
even more likely with start-ups because the chances of the
client business ending up bankrupt are often great.
49
142. See id.
143. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 27, at 256.15.
144. See Formal Opinion 372, supra note 139.
145. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 27, at 256.15.
146. See id.
147. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7, at 10.
148. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) cmt. (1984).
149. See Baker, supra note 1, at 36.
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B. Abiding by Model Rule 1.8 and Accepting Stock
Compensation
Compliance with Model Rule 1.7 is required when any
possibility of material conflict exists between the attorney's
own interests in the corporation and the interests of the cli-
ent. ' ° On the other hand, Model Rule 1.8 applies in all busi-
ness transactions between attorney and client.' An attor-
ney's receipt of stock compensation from the client is
considered a business transaction and is therefore governed
by Rule 1.8.1"
1. Meeting the Full Disclosure Requirement
The terms of the transaction must be fully disclosed in
writing in a manner that can reasonably be understood by the
client. "'53 Full disclosure includes, for example, discussions of
the consequences of any rights by virtue of the attorney's
stock ownership that may limit the client's control of the cor-
poration under special corporate by-laws or other agree-
ments." Full disclosure also includes encouraging the client
to seek independent counsel before agreeing to a stock com-
pensation transaction.'5 Additionally, the attorney must dis-
close the possibility that his economic interests as a stock-
holder could create a conflict with the client's interests,
perhaps even necessitating withdrawal from representa-
tion.' 6
As mentioned above, there are many cases dealing with
an attorney's failure to meet the full disclosure requirement.
In In re Spear ' the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the
full disclosure requirement presents a high standard for any
attorney." It requires more than making the client fully
aware of the nature and terms of the transaction. 9 Because
of the fiduciary relationship that exists between an attorney
and his client, the attorney must exercise "active diligence to
150. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1984).
151. See id. R. 1.8(a).
152. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 126 cmt. a.
153. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a); supra Part IH.B.1.
154. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7, at 10.
155. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 27, at 256.15.
156. See id.
157. 774 P.2d 1335, 1344 (Ariz. 1989).
158. See id.
159. See id.
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see that his client was fully informed of the nature and effect
of the transaction proposed and of his own rights and inter-
ests in the subject matter involved."6 °
Recall Committee on Professional Ethics v. Mershon,'
where the attorney agreed to contribute legal advice to a cor-
poration formed by the client. 62 In lieu of fees, the attorney
was to be paid twenty percent of the stock in the corpora-
tion.' The attorney made sure that the client knew all of the
terms of the transaction.1 4 Additionally, the client was an ac-
tive participant in the transaction.'65 Yet, according to the
court, this was still not enough to fulfill the burden of full dis-
closure.'66 The court suggests that the best advice for the at-
torney would have been to refuse to take stock in the corpora-
tion altogether.'67
Additionally in In the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceed-
ing Against Gary G. McGlothlen, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington held that in attorney-client transactions, the attorney
must not only show that he made an unbiased full disclosure
to the client but also that no undue influence was used.'68 In
this case, though the attorney's conduct as measured against
ordinary standards was "entirely proper," it did not meet the
"stringent requirements imposed upon an attorney dealing
with his or her client."'69 While the attorney had disclosed the
issues of the transaction with the client, the court found that
he had not done so in sufficient detail.
70
These cases illustrate many of the problems presented for
attorneys taking stock compensation from their clients. The
requirements of full disclosure are stringent. The attorney
must present all known possibilities for conflict to the client
in order for the client to evaluate and determine whether to
consent to the transaction. 17 Additionally, this type of disclo-
sure is not only required when the agreement is first made,
160. Goldman v. Kane, 329 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975).
161. 316 N.W.2d 895 (Iowa 1982); see supra Part II.B.l.b.ii.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See Mershon, 316 N.W.2d at 899.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. See Reimer, supra note 5, at 36.
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but also when every actual conflict arises.'72 According to
Rule 1.7(b) the client may consent to a conflict in representa-
tion only after consultation. 17' Therefore, this is an on-going
requirement for the attorney. It lives as long as the attorney
is taking stock fees from his client.
C. Rationale for Strictly Regulating Stock Compensation
1. The Difficulty of Complying with the Model Rules
The brief analysis above presented some of the problems
that attorneys face when taking stock compensation and try-
ing to comply with the Model Rules at the same time.'74 Even
well-meaning attorneys and law firms are liable to make un-
reasonable assumptions regarding the effect their equity in-
terest in the corporation has on their representation.'75 For
these reasons, ABA Formal Opinion 418 poses its own "inher-
ent conflict" when it counsels attorneys to take compensation
and abide by the Model Rules at the same time.
2. Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety
As mentioned above, an attorney ought not to engage in
activities that bear the appearance of impropriety.'76 Such
impropriety would be exhibited if the representation of the
client appears in any way colored by the attorney's own inter-
ests."'77 Many members of the bar recognize that as a general
counselor and adviser to their client, if an attorney also has "a
hand in the cash register" it is likely that his representation
will appear colored by his interest in the well-being of the
stock of the corporation. 7
8
This affected representation is even more pronounced
when the attorney is not making a simple investment in the
corporation, but is instead accepting stock compensation in
lieu of normal cash fees. Stock compensation creates a much
greater dependency on the part of the attorney; he is not rely-
ing on the price of the corporation's stock merely for recrea-
172. See supra Part IV.A.2.
173. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1984).
174. See supra Part IV.
175. See supra Part IV.A.1.
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. See supra Part H.A.
178. See Chanen, supra note 132, at 81.
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tional investment purposes, but for his very payment." 9
3. Liability Under the Securities Exchange Acts
Attorneys investing in clients may also open themselves
up to securities liability under various provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Securities Exchange Acts. Of the six elements com-
prising a 10b-5 claim, fraudulent intent or "scienter" is often
the most difficult element to prove. But when a law firm ac-
tually has a financial stake in the corporation, it becomes
more likely that a factfinder will find that the firm or the spe-
cific attorney did act with the requisite mental intent or reck-
lessness required by the courts.8 Once intent is found, at-
torneys are held jointly and severally liable. 8
Securities fraud issues arise for attorneys in many differ-
ent types of situations.'82 First, an attorney may be held li-
able for engaging in intentional fraud or deceit.'83 Second, an
attorney may be held liable under either the traditional or
misappropriation theories of insider trading.8 4 Traditional
insider trading is trading by an individual, typically man-
agement of the corporation, based on inside information.
8 5
Attorneys may be held liable under this theory as "temporary
insiders" if they have some interest in or relationship to the
conduct of the corporation and have assented to an expecta-
tion on the part of the corporation that the information will
be kept confidential.'86 The misappropriation theory holds li-
able those attorneys that trade based on information they
have gained in violation of a fiduciary duty. Attorneys may
also be accused of 10b-5 fraud when they are relied upon for
opinion letters regarding the viability of the corporation or
the fairness of a particular transaction, or when drafting a
prospectus for an issuer. 7
When an attorney takes an interest in a corporation, and
then attempts to draft documents regarding the viability of
the company, it is clear that bias could easily play a role.
179. See Baker, supra note 1.
180. See Patterson, supra note 23, at 655.
181. See id.
182. See Patterson, supra note 23, at 653.
183. See Bedrick, supra note 101, at 1304.
184. See id. at 1304.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 1303. See also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
187. See Bedrick, supra note 101, at 1304.
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Furthermore, the argument that the loyalties of attorneys or
law firms with stock in their clients naturally align with the
shareholders is not always an accurate depiction of reality.88
Unlike typical shareholders, attorneys often possess confiden-
tial knowledge about the viability and financial structure of
the company. Additionally, corporations often give attorneys
stock at "different prices and with different rights than those
sold at IPO." 18' For these reasons, when 10b-5 claims are in-
volved, knowledge can most definitely become lethal for the
corporate attorney.
With regard to section 15 and section 20 "controlling per-
son" liability, it is important to note that the client corpora-
tion must first commit an illegal act before any liability would
fall on the attorney. If this can be shown, then under section
15, every person who through "stock ownership or otherwise"
controls a person who is liable for registration fraud will be
found jointly and severally liable as well. Typically, attorneys
who strictly perform their professional duties, will not be held
liable under section 15. Those firms that branch out and pro-
vide services that go beyond traditional legal services, how-
ever, may be opening themselves up to liability.9 '
Section 20 liability is broader, in that attorneys may be
held liable not simply as controlling persons whose actions led
to a misrepresentation in the initial public offering, but also
for controlling any other violations under the 1934 Act. The
legal implications associated with accepting stock compensa-
tion as applied to these two sections are obvious. Some large
law firms are interested in providing business advice to the
client as well as other services in order to increase the total
profits for the law firm. This itself could lead to controlling
person liability. But add to that the fact that a law firm is re-
ceiving their compensation for services rendered in the form
of corporate stockholdings, and the chances of a jury finding
liability are increased significantly. Unfortunately, the ap-
pearance of the situation simply looks bad for any law firm
when the corporate client or "controlled entity" engages in
any type of Security Exchange Act violation. Any kind of "in-
188. See Patterson, supra note 23, at 656.
189. See id.
190. In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity, 636 F.Supp 1138 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (denying
attorney's motion for summary judgment when the plaintiff sufficiently demon-
strated control).
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dependence" on the part of the law firm appears lost.
V. PROPOSAL
Many good reasons exist for allowing attorneys to take
stock compensation."' Some of the most cited are: (1) cash-
poor start-ups are in need of representation; (2) the interests
of the corporation typically coincide with the personal inter-
ests of the attorney in increasing his wealth; and (3) both par-
ties benefit from the transaction.92 But these reasons may
not always be sufficient to overcome the ethical dilemma that
attorneys face whenever they are deciding whether to accept
compensation in the form of stockholdings.
The purpose of enacting conflict of interest regulations is
to prevent conflicts from occurring, and to avoid the appear-
ance of impropriety on the part of the attorney'9  The ABA
has concluded that any conflict of interest associated with
stock compensation for services is not sufficient to character-
ize it as a prohibited transaction altogether.' Instead, the
ABA has stated that attorneys taking stock compensation
must be sure to comply with the requirements of Model Rules
1.7 and 1.8.19
But, as seen above, this is a daunting task.'96 It requires
an attorney to be attentive to small details that could grow
into serious conflicts. Additionally, the attorney must make
several "reasonableness" assessments in order to determine
whether or not to even continue representation.9 7 At any of
these stages an attorney may make an incorrect determina-
tion and open himself up to malpractice lawsuits and discipli-
nary action. Furthermore, an attorney or law firm heavily
involved in the business dealings of the client, may also face
liability under the Securities Exchange Act.
Some would argue that the better rule would be for the
ABA to follow the lead of the AICPA and recognize a per se
conflict of interest whenever an attorney receives stock com-
pensation for services rendered. There appears to be no fun-
191. See supra Part 1I.
192. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7.
193. See supra Part II.A.
194. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7.
195. See id.
196. See supra Part IV.
197. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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damental reason for banning stock-based compensation for
one group and not the other. Both are advising and counsel-
ing their clients. Both are involved in financial matters of the
corporation. Both would have an interest in seeing the stock
of the corporation succeed if they were accepting an equity in-
terest in lieu of fees.
Beyond this similarity, there are many other reasons for
prohibiting these types of transactions.'98 First, the extent of
coverage under attorney professional responsibility policies
when the lawyer is also a stockholder is typically limited.'99
Many professional responsibility policies do not cover attor-
neys that take equity interests in their clients. 00 Second,
there is a great possibility for civil liability claims, including
stockholder derivative actions resulting from the attorney
representing the client in certain matters. 01 Third, stock
compensation agreements increase internal disharmony
among lawyers in the firm regarding investment opportuni-
ties that individual attorneys may be offered by clients.2 1' Fi-
nally, whenever stock compensation agreements are made,
the risks of attorney non-compliance with securities laws and
regulations increase.2°'
There has been significant pressure placed on the bar
and on many law firms to condone stock compensation
agreements."4 While prohibiting these transactions alto-
gether may potentially be the better rule, it appears unlikely
that the ABA or law firms themselves will ban these profit-
generating transactions. After tasting sweet success in the
late nineties, law firms representing start-ups are eager to
experience the rush of high profits again. In addition, attor-
ney retention within large law firms is often at least partially
based on whether stock agreements are accepted."' There-
fore, since it is improbable that these agreements will be pro-
hibited at this stage, it would be beneficial for law firms to
198. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7.
199. See id.
200. See Edward J. Cleary, When the Lawyer Takes a Stake, BENCH & B. OF
MINN., (May/June 2000), available at
http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2000/m-j00/invest-prof-resp.htm.
201. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See Cleary, supra note 200.
205. See id.
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take certain precautions in order to prevent the liability that
naturally follows many stock compensation transactions.
A. Supervising Attorney Takes No Equitable Interest in the
Client
This option is recommended in the ABA's Formal Opinion
on stock compensation." Basically, the ABA argues that for
law firms accepting stock compensation, the supervisory re-
sponsibility over the lawyer-client transactions should be
given to a partner who does not have equitable ownership in
the client. This arrangement would ensure at least some in-
dependence for the law firm and reduce the appearance of
conflict. The supervising attorney would be able to evaluate
the transaction from a less biased perspective and could at-
tempt to ensure that the attorney accepting stock compensa-
tion exercises no undue influence on the client.
B. Limit the Percentage of Stockholdings in the Client
Another possible avenue would be for law firms to limit
the percentage of stockholdings that the firm may take in a
particular client. A smaller percentage of stockholdings will
likely lead to less controlling person liability. The more stock
a law firm takes in a corporation, the more it steps outside its
traditional legal role into the realm of business dealings, run-
ning the risk of being sued by angry shareholders. Beyond
the actual percentage, law firms should be careful not to ac-
cept an amount of stock that has such high value that it cre-
ates a major dependency on the client by the law firm. Spe-
cifically, small firms should be careful not to become
completely dependent on the stock of a particular client.
C. Avoid Close Business Dealings with the Client
Law firms interested in avoiding disciplinary action un-
der the Model Rules and the Securities Exchange Act should
take steps to show that the firm is not engaging in a signifi-
cant business advisory role with the client. Some large firms
are now considering branching out and providing this type of
business advice to their corporate clients. This situation,
however, creates a dependency relationship between attorney
and client which may very well lead to controlling person li-
206. See Formal Opinion 418, supra note 7, at 11.
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ability. Therefore, for firms interested in preventing future
lawsuits by disgruntled shareholders, it is better to avoid cre-
ating this type of business relationship.
D. Give up Voting Rights Associated with Stock
In order to prevent a situation where the law firm must
take a voting position that is adverse to the corporate client,
many law firms already do give up the voting rights associ-
ated with their stockholdings. 7 This is an essential step; law
firms holding on to voting rights may get caught in a situa-
tion where they are tempted to exercise their rights in a way
that may actually hurt the client, creating an undeniable con-
flict of interest between the attorney's own interests and the
interests of the client. The conflict of interest is serious in na-
ture, but if law firms agree to give up voting rights altogether
this problematical situation may be avoided.
IV. CONCLUSION
Model Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(a) pose high ethical hurdles
for attorneys desiring to invest in promising start-ups."8
Though an attorney might believe he is taking all the neces-
sary precautions required by the Model Rules, some small
mistake on his part could lead to serious liability."9 Addi-
tionally, whenever an attorney enters into any business
agreement with his client, he is risking his professional repu-
tation.210 This risk is heightened for attorneys accepting stock
compensation in lieu of fees because they are putting their ac-
tual salary on the line.21'
While the ABA may be incorrect in stating that no inher-
ent conflict of interest arises when attorneys accept stock in
lieu of fees, it appears unlikely that the ABA will actually
prohibit these transactions. It seems even more improbable
that large law firms handling high-tech clients will be willing
to give up the potential profits that these transactions gener-
ate. Therefore, at this point, the best idea for law firms in-
sisting on stock compensation agreements would be to employ
the suggested precautions in order to avoid opening them-
207. See Manning, supra note 21.
208. See supra Parts II, IV.
209. See supra Part IV.A-B.
210. See supra Part II.A.
211. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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selves up to future liability.

